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Consumer	Net	Income			 A	consumer’s	net	income	Ii,t	is	determined	by	the	consumer’s	income,	the	consumer’s	consumption,	and	whether	or	not	a	shock	is	experienced.	Since	all	these	variables	have	consistent	expected	values	over	time,	E[Ii,s]	=	E[Ii,t]	for	any	periods	s,t.	In	any	period	for	a	specific	consumer,	the	expectation	of	Ii	can	be	written	in	terms	of	Yi	as	shown	below		 4.	 E[Ii]	=	E[Yi](1-	γi	–	λΨ)	 	 	 	 	 	Note	that	before	the	model	is	created	and	consumers	are	instantiated,	all	consumers	are	expected	to	be	identical	so	the	subscript	for	the	consumer	can	be	dropped.	The	expectation	of	any	consumer’s	net	income	in	any	period	is		 5.	 E[I]	=	Y*(1	–	γ*	–	λΨ)		 	 	 	In	a	later	section,	E[I]	will	be	shown	to	be	crucial	in	keeping	the	expected	level	of	wealth	in	the	overall	system	constant	over	time.		 If	a	consumer	has	net	income	such	that	Ii,t	>	0,	they	can	invest	Ii,t	in	an	asset	with	a	two-tiered	return	(a	low	return	if	held	for	one	period	or	a	high	return	if	held	for	two	periods)	and	carry	these	savings	into	the	future.	A	consumer	will	earn	positive	net	income	if	they	do	not	experience	a	negative	shock	since	Xi,t	=	0.	In	this	case,		 	 Ii,t	=	Yi,t	–	Ci,t	





















Diamond	and	Dybvig	Tipping	Point			 In	the	DD	model,	if	a	large	enough	proportion	of	the	consumer	population	elects	to	withdraw	their	consumer	assets	after	just	one	period,	the	bank	cannot	possibly	meet	all	of	its	obligations,	as	the	value	of	its	assets	will	be	less	than	the	value	of	its	liabilities.	Consider	the	case	where	100	consumers	each	have	$1	so	they	collectively	deposit	$100	into	the	bank.	After	one	period,	the	bank’s	assets	have	a	present	value	of	αb($100)	but	liabilities	with	a	present	value	of	αc($100)	and	αb	<	αc.	If	the	proportion	of	type	1	consumers,	who	fully	withdraw	their	money	from	the	bank	after	one	period,	T1,	is	large	enough	such	that		 13.	 β!  = !! ( !!! !! !! )!!(!!!!)  <  α! 	 	 	 	 	 	 36	the	bank	will	fail.	If	βc	<	αc,	all	consumers,	not	just	type	1	consumers,	have	an	incentive	to	withdraw	their	assets	after	one	period	instead	of	waiting	another	period	to	receive	a	lower	return.	Thus	all	consumers	would	attempt	to	withdraw	their	money	after	one	period.		Essentially,	bank	runs	occur	any	time	that	withdrawals	in	period	one	are	too	large.	At	this	point,	the	bank’s	leftover	assets	are	so	small	that	when	they	are	evenly	distributed	among	the	remaining	consumers	in	period	two,	those	consumers	receive	a	return	less	than	what	they	could	have	received	from	the	bank	after	just	one	period,	αc.	Thus	the	benefit	of	waiting	an	additional	period	to	receive	returns	is	now																																																									36	This	follows	the	idea	that	type	2	consumers	receive	a	pro	rata	share	of	the	bank’s	remaining	assets	as	described	previously.	The	operating	cost	mentioned	in	the	previous	section	would	decrease	the	total	remaining	assets	for	the	bank	(the	numerator)	such	that	consumers	would	receive	a	lower	βc.	
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negative	so	all	consumers	would	attempt	to	withdraw	their	money	after	one	period	regardless	of	their	type.		




	 Extending	this	idea	to	the	PBLM,	the	tipping	point	is	deemed	to	be	when	the	bank’s	assets	are	not	sufficient	to	cover	expected	obligations	in	the	next	period	(and	the	current	period	too).	At	this	point,	consumers	expect	the	bank	to	be	unable	to	service	all	withdrawal	requests	in	the	immediate	future.	In	this	situation,	consumers	will	panic	and	withdraw	their	money	early	to	avoid	being	among	those	consumers	that	will	lose	all	assets	when	the	bank	fails.		 Diamond	and	Dybvig	call	this	the	bank	run	equilibrium.	It	“provides	allocations	that	are	worse	for	all	agents	than	they	would	have	obtained	without	the	bank	(trading	in	the	competitive	market)”	because	“all	production	is	interrupted	at	T	=	1	when	it	is	optimal	for	some	to	continue	until	T	=2.”43	Further,	any	consumers	that	are	not	served	by	the	time	the	bank	runs	out	of	assets	receive	no	return	at	all	and	lose	the	entire	value	of	their	initial	investment.		 If	the	tipping	point	of	withdrawals	is	not	reached,	consumers	will	not	panic	and	there	will	be	no	bank	run.	Diamond	and	Dybvig	refer	to	this	as	the	efficient	risk																																																									41	This	idea	of	all	consumers	panicking	together	will	be	explored	more	in	depth.	This	idea	makes	the	terms	bank	panics	and	bank	failures	synonymous	in	the	DD	as	consumers	only	panic	if	the	bank	is	going	to	fail	and	if	the	bank	is	going	to	fail,	consumers	panic.	42	DD	(1983)	p.409.	43	Ibid	
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	 This	change	from	the	original	asset	terminology	to	the	new	short	term	assets	and	long	term	assets	may	seem	unnecessary	upon	first	glance.	However,	from	a	programmatic	sense,	short	term	and	long	term	assets	are	much	easier	to	manage	than	a	single	asset	with	a	two-tiered	set	of	returns.58	Also,	this	new	terminology	better	fits	a	system	with	an	unbounded	number	of	periods	as	opposed	to	the	DD	model	which	had	exactly	three	periods.			 If	one	were	to	extend	the	DD	model	as	the	PBLM	does,	in	the	third	period,	the	underlying	asset	after	being	held	for	two	periods	would	just	be	liquidated	at	β	times	the	original	face	value	and	then	reinvested	as	new	underlying	assets	with	face	value	β	times	the	original	face	value.	Upon	reaching	maturity	in	the	third	period,	the	underlying	asset	is	really	just	treated	like	the	consumer’s	initial	endowment	in	the	first	period	which	was	only	worth	its	face	value.	This	has	the	same	effect	as	holding	long	term	assets	for	an	additional	period	and	then	converting	those	long	term	assets	into	short	term	assets	at	β	times	face	value.	Thus	the	short	term/long	term	system	is	a	natural	extension	of	the	original	DD	model	to	the	PBLM	which	has	additional	periods.		 The	table	on	the	next	page	indicates	the	analogs	between	the	original	terminology	and	the	new	terminology.	Notice	that	the	liquidation	or	present	values	for	holdings	in	the	same	row	are	equivalent.	The	liquidation	values	capture	the	present	worth	of	the	assets,	thus	the	holdings	in	the	same	rows	are	equivalent.		 	
																																																								58	It	is	really	a	three-tiered	system	if	one	includes	liquidating	after	0	periods.	
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Asset	Conversions63			 Consumers	are	able	to	invest	any	net	positive	income	into	their	bank.	In	any	period	t,	a	consumer’s	net	income,	Ii,t,	is	described	by	16.	 Ii,t	=	Yi,t	–	Ci,t	–	Xi,t	 	 	 	 	 	 	Ii,t	can	be	considered	as	the	first	part	of	the	potential	change	in	a	consumer’s	short	term	assets	in	period	t.	Should	the	consumer	hold	any	long	term	assets	in	period	t-1,	in	period	t,	those	assets	are	converted	into	short	term	assets	at	the	long	term	return	β.	However,	any	long	term	assets	held	in	period	t-1	would	necessitate	that	the	same	face	value	amount	of	short	term	assets	had	been	held	in	period	t-2.	Hence	in	period	t,	the	total	amount	of	short	term	assets,	Ji,t,	is	described	recursively	by	17.	 Ji,t	=	Ii,t	+	β(Ji,t-2)	for	t	≥	2	 	 	 	 	 	 64	
For	periods	0	and	1,	 let	L*	be	the	consumer’s	initial	face	value	endowment	of	long	term	assets.	Let	S*	be	the	consumer’s	initial	face	value	endowment	of	short	term	assets,	so	we	have	
18.	 Ji,0	=	Ii,0	+	S*		 	 	 	 	 	 																																																									63	In	this	section,	the	subscripts	on	the	asset	returns	are	dropped.	The	principles	described	are	applicable	to	both	consumer	assets	and	bank	assets.	64	This	only	holds	if	Jt	≥	0	for	all	t.	E[Jt]	>	0	for	all	t.	
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	 19.	 Ji,1	=	Ii,1	+	β	(L*)		 	 	 	 	 	 65			 Any	short	term	assets	held	in	the	previous	period	are	rolled	over	into	long	term	assets	in	the	current	period.	Thus	the	total	amount	of	long	term	assets	in	period	t,	Li,t,	can	be	described	by		 20.	 Li,t	=	Ji,t-1	for	t		≥	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	 66		 Since	short	term	assets	are	liquidated	at	face	value	and	long	term	assets	can	be	liquidated	in	the	current	period	at	the	short	term	return	α,	the	present	value	of	a	consumer’s	total	assets	in	period	t,	Ki,t,	is	described	by		 Ki,t	=	α(Lt)	+	β(Ji,t-2)	+	Ii,t	for	t	≥	2,	substituting	equation	20	yields	 	21.	 Ki,t	=	α(Ji,t-1)	+	Ji,t	for	t	≥	2	 	 	 	 	 	 67	 	For	periods	0	and	1,		 22.	 Ki,0	=	Ii,0	+	S*	+	α	(L*)		 	 	 	 	 	23.	 Ki,1	=		Ii,1	+	α(J0)	+		β	(L*)	 with	the	substitution	in	equation	18	 	Although	subscripts	indicating	that	these	are	values	specific	to	each	consumer	are	included,	the	expectation	of	each	consumer’s	attributes	are	identical	before	the	consumers	are	instantiated.	Thus	the	subscripts	indicating	the	consumer	can	be	dropped	when	expectations	are	taken.	The	time	subscript	on	net	income	could	also	be	dropped	as	described	in	the	Net	Income	section.	Bank	assets	convert	similarly	to	the	consumer	assets	using	the	bank	rates	instead	of	the	consumer	rates.																																																									65	There	is	no	subscript	on	either	initial	endowment	as	it	will	be	the	same	for	every	consumer.	66	Assuming	Ji,t-1	≥	0.	If	Ji,t-1	<	0,	Li,t	=	0;	67	Assuming	Ji,t-1	≥	0.	
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Stationarity		








specific	consumer	will	be	dropped.	Let	the	consumer’s	expected	current	total	level	of	assets	before	she	receives	her	net	income	in	period	t	be	represented	by	Kt.	Stationarity	implies	24.	 Kt		=	Ks	=	K*	for	all	periods	s	and	t	where	K*	is	the	total	value	of	the	consumer’s	initial	endowments	of	resources	 	 77	 	 	Stationarity	is	also	defined	here	to	mean	that	the	consumer’s	expected	levels	of	short	term	and	long	term	assets	are	constant.	Let	the	consumer’s	expected	face	value	amounts	of	short	term	and	long	term	assets	in	period	t	before	she	receives	her	net	income	be	St	and	Lt,	respectively.	Stationarity	implies		 25.	 St	=	Ss	=	S*	for	all	periods	s	and	t			 26.	 Lt	=	Ls	=	L*	for	all	periods	s	and	t	where	S*	and	L*	are	the	initial	endowments	of	short	term	and	long	term	assets	for	all	consumers.		 Consider	the	actions	the	consumer	undertakes	in	each	period.	She	initially	receives	her	net	income	which	has	an	expected	value	I*.	Since	consumer	assets	grow	over	time	at	positive	rates	βc	and	αc,	I*	must	be	negative	to	keep	the	expected	total	value	of	assets	constant	over	time.	Using	equation	5,	this	means		 I*	=	E[I]	=	Y*(1	–	γ*	–	λΨ)	<	0	which	implies	27.	 1	–	γ*	–	λΨ	<	0	In	the	section	on	net	income,	γ*,	λ,	and	Ψ	are	all	at	least	0	since	they	are	the	consumer’s	expected	average	consumption	rate,	probability	of	getting	shocked,	and	
																																																								77	Initial	resource	endowments	are	identical	for	all	consumers.	
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the	income	multiplier	of	the	shock.	Equation	27	yields	a	relationship	indicating	the	necessary	magnitudes	of	these	variables.		 Following	the	principles	outlined	in	the	Asset	Liquidation	section,	consumers	liquidate	all	short	term	assets	before	any	long	term	assets	due	to	the	real	cost	associated	with	early	liquidation.	Thus	the	consumer	expects	to	pay	a	deficit	of	|I*|	each	period.		Suppose	|I*|	≥	S*.	Then	she	is	expected	to	exhaust	her	entire	supply	of	short	term	assets	each	period.	This	is	unsustainable	as	this	means	she	is	expected	to	have	0	long	term	assets	in	the	next	period	following	the	asset	conversion	guidelines.	This	is	impossible	under	the	definition	of	stationarity	unless	her	initial	long	term	asset	endowment	is	0.	We	will	ignore	this	case	as	it	would	be	trivial.	Therefore	we	assume		28.	 |I*|	<	S*		 After	the	consumer	pays	off	her	deficit,	she	has	S*+	I*	in	short	term	assets	and	L*.	Following	the	asset	conversion	process,	this	means	in	period	t+1	before	she	receives	her	net	income	she	will	have	S*+	I*	in	long	term	assets	and	β(L*)	in	short	term	assets.	Since	we	have	been	using	expected	values	this	entire	time,	according	to	stationarity	of	short	term	assets,	equation	25	means	S*	=	β(L*)	29.	 L*	=	!∗! 	 	Equation	29	indicates	the	balance	between	the	initial	face	value	of	the	short	term	asset	endowment	and	initial	face	value	of	the	long	term	asset	endowment	for	all	consumers	under	the	assumption	of	stationarity.	This	is	a	key	calibrating	relationship	in	the	PBLM.	
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Proximity	Based	Learning	Tipping	Point		 		 Consumers	use	the	liquidity	information	they	obtain	from	the	proximity	based	learning	process	to	gauge	overall	liquidity	demands	on	the	bank.	If	they	feel	liquidity	demands	are	larger	than	the	bank	can	meet,	they	panic.	The	balance	between	liquidity	demands	and	the	bank’s	assets	will	now	be	discussed.92		 Banks	in	the	PBLM	are	always	net	negative.	Consumers	initially	deposit	short	term	assets	which	the	bank	offers	back	to	them	at	face	value.	The	long	term	assets	consumers	initially	deposit	are	redeemable	to	the	consumer	at	αc	times	face	value	but	the	bank	can	only	liquidate	long	term	assets	at	αb	times	face	value	and	αb	<	αc.	Hence	the	bank’s	liabilities	are	greater	than	its	assets.	Under	the	stationarity	assumptions,	expected	consumer	assets	(or	the	bank’s	liabilities)	are	constant	and	expected	bank	assets	are	constant	so	the	bank	is	always	expected	to	have	a	negative	net	worth.	This	is	actually	not	problematic.	In	period	1	of	the	DD	model,	the	bank	is	also	net	negative.	In	fact,	any	liquidity	services	provided	by	the	bank	at	all	necessitates	that	the	bank	be	net	negative	at	least	sometimes	and	exposed	to	bank	runs.93		 Similar	to	the	DD	model,	the	bank	can	be	net	negative	and	consumers	are	not	necessarily	worried.	Consumers	need	only	be	worried	when	other	consumers																																																									92	Banks	use	their	short	term	and	long	term	assets	to	meet	obligations.	93	DD	(1983)	p.403.	
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withdraw	so	much	money	from	the	bank	that	the	bank	will	run	out	of	assets	to	meet	its	expected	obligations	in	the	next	period.94	Thus	the	bank	can	exist	in	a	net	negative	state	as	long	as	consumers	believe	the	bank	can	meet	its	expected	obligations.	What	follows	will	build	off	of	ideas	of	the	DD	and	PBLM	equilibria	discussed	in	the	Diamond	and	Dybvig	Equlibria	section.		 We	will	now	consider	the	bank’s	per	capita	level	of	assets.	In	the	first	period,	the	bank	has	S*	in	short	term	assets	and	L	in	long	term	assets.	The	consumer	has	expected	net	income	I	<	0	and	the	bank’s	operating	cost	per	consumer	is	d	<	0.	Suppose	the	consumer’s	actual	net	income	in	the	period	is		32.	 I1	=	-(S*	+	𝛼!(!! ! !!!!!! ))	<	0	 	 	 	 	 	 95	Then	the	consumer	withdraws	–I1	from	the	bank.96	The	bank	must	now	generate	–I1	in	value	by	liquidating	its	short	and	long	term	assets.	Following	the	liquidation	rules,	the	bank	initially	attempts	to	liquidate	–I1	using	it	short	term	assets.	However,	since			 33.	 I1>	S*	The	bank	liquidates	all	of	its	short	term	assets	but	must	still	service	the	remaining	𝛼!(!! ! !!!!!! ).	Since	the	bank	liquidates	its	long	term	assets	at	a	rate	of	αb	times	face	value,	it	must	liquidate	(!! ! !!!!!! )	in	face	value	of	long	term	assets	to	fully	meet	the	obligation.	The	bank	is	able	to	do	so	since	d,	I	<	0	and	=< 𝐿.	Thus	the	bank	will	have	
																																																								94	If	the	bank	is	unable	to	meet	its	expected	obligations	in	the	current	period,	it	surely	cannot	meet	obligations	in	the	next	period.	95	Assume	𝛽! 𝐿 + 𝑑 + 𝐼	>	0		96	Assume	that	the	consumer	has	the	assets	to	make	such	a	withdrawal.	
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L	-	(!! ! !!!!!! )	in	face	value	long	term	assets	and	no	short	term	assets	at	the	end	of	the	period.		 Following	the	asset	conversion	process	into	the	next	period,	the	bank’s	long	term	assets	are	converted	into	short	term	assets	at	a	rate	of	βb	times	face	value.	Thus	the	bank	will	now	have			 34.	 βb(L	-	(!! ! !!!!!! ))	=	βb(L)	-	βb(L)	–	d	–	I		=	-d	–	I		
























































































Changing	Magnitude	of	Net	Income		 		 As	described	in	the	stationarity	section,	the	expected	value	of	net	income	I	is	negative.	Increasing	the	magnitude	of	net	income	here	refers	to	consumers	consuming	a	larger	portion	of	their	gross	income	in	each	period.	Recall	that		 43.	 I	=	E[I]	=	Y*(1	–	γ*	–	λΨ)	<	0	which	implies			 44.	 1	–	γ*	–	λΨ	<	0	since	Y*,	γ*,	λ,	and	Ψ	are	all	at	least	0	since	they	are	respectively	the	consumer’s	expected	gross	income,	expected	average	consumption	rate,	probability	of	getting	shocked,	and	the	income	multiplier	of	the	shock.	Increasing	the	magnitude	of	net	income	was	achieved	by	increasing	the	probability	of	consumers	suffering	an	idiosyncratic	shock,	λ.	
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-82500	 -62500	 -32500	 -12500	
Consumer	Shock	Probability	 0.9	 0.7	 0.4	 0.2	
Consumer	Short	Term	Endowment	 100000	 100000	 100000	 100000	
Consumer	Long	Term	Endowment	 17499.98688	 37499.95313	 67500.0675	 88945.33953	
Consumer	Gross	Income	 50000	 50000	 50000	 50000	
Consumer	Short	Term	Payout	 1	 1	 1	 1	
Consumer	Long	Term	Payout	 5.71429	 2.66667	 1.48148	 1.124286	
Consumer	Mean	Rate	of	
Consumption	 0.85	 0.85	 0.85	 0.85	
Consumer	Shock	Multiplier	 2	 2	 2	 2	
Consumer	Population	 100	 100	 100	 100	
Consumer	Group	Size	 25	 25	 25	 25	
All	Consumers	Visible	 FALSE	 FALSE	 FALSE	 FALSE	
Bank	Assets	Visible	 FALSE	 FALSE	 FALSE	 FALSE	
Bank	Long	Term	Asset	Return	 6	 2.8	 1.55555	 1.2	
Bank	Short	Term	Asset	Return	 1	 1	 1	 1	
Bank	Count	 1	 1	 1	 1	












































αc	=	1	 αc	=	1.5	 αc	=	1.8	 αc	=	2.3	
Consumer	Shock	Probability	 0.9	 0.9	 0.9	 0.9	
Consumer	Short	Term	Endowment	 100000	 100000	 100000	 100000	
Consumer	Long	Term	Endowment	 17499.987	 17499.987	 17499.987	 17499.987	
Consumer	Gross	Income	 50000	 50000	 50000	 50000	
Consumer	Net	Income	 -82500	 -82500	 -82500	 -82500	
Consumer	Long	Term	Payout	 5.71429	 5.71429	 5.71429	 5.71429	
Consumer	Mean	Rate	of	
Consumption	 0.85	 0.85	 0.85	 0.85	
Consumer	Shock	Multiplier	 2	 2	 2	 2	
Consumer	Population	 100	 100	 100	 100	
Consumer	Group	Size	 10	 10	 10	 10	
All	Consumers	Visible	 FALSE	 FALSE	 FALSE	 FALSE	
Bank	Assets	Visible	 FALSE	 FALSE	 FALSE	 FALSE	
Bank	Long	Term	Asset	Return	 6	 6	 6	 6	
Bank	Short	Term	Asset	Return	 1	 1	 1	 1	
Bank	Count	 1	 1	 1	 1	




















































Group	Size	2	 Group	Size	5	 Group	Size	10	 Group	Size	25	 Group	Size	100	
Consumer	Shock		
Probability	 0.9	 0.9	 0.9	 0.9	 0.9	
Consumer	Short	
Term		
Endowment	 100000	 100000	 100000	 100000	 100000	
Consumer	Long	Term		
Endowment	 17499.987	 17499.987	 17499.987	 17499.987	 17499.987	
Consumer	Gross	
Income	 50000	 50000	 50000	 50000	 50000	
Consumer	Net	
Income	 -82500	 -82500	 -82500	 -82500	 -82500	
Consumer	Short	
Term	
	Payout	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	
Consumer	Long	Term		
Payout	 5.71429	 5.71429	 5.71429	 5.71429	 5.71429	
Consumer	Mean	Rate	
of	Consumption	 0.85	 0.85	 0.85	 0.85	 0.85	
Consumer	Shock	
Multiplier	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	
Consumer	Population	 100	 100	 100	 100	 100	
All	Consumers	Visible	 FALSE	 FALSE	 FALSE	 FALSE	 FALSE	
Bank	Assets	Visible	 FALSE	 FALSE	 FALSE	 FALSE	 FALSE	
Bank	Long	Term	
Asset	Return	 6	 6	 6	 6	 6	
Bank	Short	Term	
Asset	Return	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	
Bank	Count	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	





















































































































































































No	Bank	Visibility	and	Group	Size	=	10	 0.288456471			 Under	both	scenarios,	no	bank	failures	occurred.	Hence	all	panics	were	unnecessary	panics.	Given	that	unnecessary	panics	do	not	occur	with	visibility,	it	is	unsurprising	that	the	panic	proportion	for	visibility	was	0.	The	panic	proportion	without	visibility	was	0.288.	As	mentioned	throughout	this	paper,	there	is	a	real	cost	associated	with	panics.	Diamond	and	Dybvig	define	it	as	the	cost	of	recalling	loans	and	interrupting	production.122	There	is	also	the	real	penalty	associated	with	liquidating	one’s	assets	early.	Thus	panicking	is	costly	and	should	be	avoided	unless	it	is	necessary.	With	bank	visibility	and	consumer	visibility,	the	proportion	of	unnecessary	panics	was	and	will	be	0.	This	means	all	the	costs	associated	with	unnecessary	panics	are	avoided	with	better	visibility.	In	order	to	reduce	costs	associated	with	unnecessary	bank	failures,	this	study	suggests	the	banking	system	be	as	transparent	as	possible	about	the	bank’s	assets	and	liquidity	demands.		 Increasing	group	size	was	found	to	be	an	effective	way	to	increase	the	accuracy	of	consumer	estimates	regarding	the	liquidity	demands	in	the	system.	Unfortunately	this	study	was	unable	to	explore	any	effective	ways	to	increase	the	accuracy	of	bank	asset	estimates	aside	from	allowing	consumers	to	directly	see	the	bank’s	assets.	Several	alternatives	to	the	ad-hoc	expectation	process	of	bank	assets	are	discussed	in	the	Distortions	subsection	of	the	Proximity	Based	Learning	section.	
																																																								122	DD	p.404	
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Identifying	ways	to	allow	consumers	to	more	accurately	perceive	the	actual	holdings	of	the	bank	without	infringing	on	privacy	or	competitive	concerns	is	key	in	preventing	unnecessary	panics.		 Interestingly,	the	optimal	scenario	of	bank	and	consumer	visibility	is	the	same	scenario	that	this	study	criticizes	for	being	unrealistic.	In	practice,	this	scenario	still	is	impractical.	The	whole	basis	for	proximity	based	learning	is	the	assumption	that	consumers	only	have	access	to	limited	information	on	the	system.	However,	these	results	indicate	that	unnecessary	panics	are	the	result	of	consumers	receiving	information	that	does	not	accurately	reflect	the	state	of	the	system.	Thus	providing	avenues	for	consumers	to	understand	that	the	system	is	not	in	a	failure	situation	is	very	helpful	in	discouraging	false	panics.		 		
Conclusion		
Place	in	Line		The	analysis	of	these	results	supports	that	proximity	based	learning	is	an	effective	form	of	communication.	As	a	consumer’s	place	in	line	increases,	the	likelihood	of	the	consumer	panicking	also	increases.	This	relationship	is	representative	of	panics	leading	to	more	panic	as	expected	in	the	theoretical	model.	
Magnitude	of	Net	Income		 The	analysis	of	these	results	supports	the	mathematical	tipping	point	analysis	where	as	the	magnitude	of	net	income	increases,	the	tipping	point	average	withdrawal	becomes	closer	to	the	expected	average	withdrawal.	As	the	two	
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approach	each	other,	it	becomes	increasingly	likely	that	the	actual	average	withdrawal	could	exceed	the	tipping	point	and	cause	consumers	to	panic	and	the	bank	to	fail.	This	result	was	consistent	with	Honohan’s	(2000)	work	which	found	smaller	economies	with	less	capital	were	at	greater	risk	of	bank	failure	than	developed	economies.	
Changing	αc	The	analysis	supports	that	as	the	liquidity	provided	by	the	bank	increases	(as	αc	increases	relative	to	αb),	the	probability	of	both	panics	and	bank	failures	increase.	This	is	the	expected	theoretical	relationship	found	in	the	DD,	Pauzner	and	Goldstein,	and	Chari	and	Jagannathan.		
Changing	Group	Size		 The	analysis	supports	that	as	group	size	increases,	consumers	see	more	accurate	information	regarding	the	liquidity	demands	on	the	overall	system.	This	is	the	expected	relationship	under	the	law	of	large	numbers.	It	was	interesting	to	note	that	although	this	relationship	holds,	the	proportion	of	panics	does	not	necessarily	decrease,	as	the	panic	condition	is	also	dependent	on	consumer	estimates	of	the	bank’s	assets.	
Bank	Visibility		 The	analysis	supported	that	when	consumers	could	see	the	bank’s	assets,	their	estimates	of	the	bank’s	assets	matched	the	actual	values.	This	result	was	unsurprising.	However,	these	data	revealed	how	the	ad-hoc	expectations	of	the	bank’s	assets	can	be	severely	distorted	when	a	shocked	consumer	uses	his	own	shock-depleted	assets	as	the	expected	per-capita	holdings	of	the	bank.	Several	
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alternatives	to	prevent	this	distortion	should	be	explored	in	future	research	including	using	a	weighted	average	of	a	consumer’s	past	asset	levels	and	allowing	the	consumer	to	view	the	assets	of	other	consumers	so	as	to	increase	the	sample	size.	This	distortion	effect	is	not	clearly	a	problem	intuitively,	but	for	experimental	purposes	alternatives	should	at	least	be	considered.	
Bank	Transparency	and	Consumer	Visibility	
	 The	analysis	supported	that	consumers	were	now	able	to	perfectly	estimate	the	bank’s	assets	and	overall	liquidity	demands	on	the	system.	The	results	actually	indicated	this	was	the	most	optimal	scenario	as	it	completely	eliminated	any	unnecessary	panics.	This	is	also	the	most	unrealistic	scenario	as	privacy	and	competitive	concerns	would	likely	prevent	banks	from	revealing	their	assets	and	prevent	consumers	from	sharing	their	liquidity	needs	with	all	other	consumers,	not	just	the	consumers	they	were	socially	proximal	to.	It	also	removes	any	need	for	proximity	based	learning	as	this	is	the	standard	DD	case.		 	The	data	support	all	the	expected	theoretical	relationships.	Thus	proximity	based	learning	is	a	concept	that	should	be	considered	for	any	future	research	regarding	the	panic	transmission	process	for	any	models	that	build	off	of	the	DD	framework.	In	general,	bank	panics	in	the	PBLM	were	largely	a	result	of	consumers	acting	on	incorrect	limited	information.	The	probability	of	unnecessary	panics	could	be	significantly	decreased	by	making	banks	more	transparent	about	the	assets	they	hold	and	the	liquidity	demands	they	face.	This	is	a	significant	solution	because	if	the	
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probability	of	an	actual	bank	failure	based	on	expected	withdrawals	is	low,	“the	only	thing	we	have	to	fear	is	fear	itself."123,124	The	PBLM	is	not	a	perfect	model.	Stationarity	in	assets	was	important	in	keeping	expected	tipping	points	constant	over	time.	Unfortunately	true	stationarity	could	not	be	achieved	due	to	the	circular	issue	where	a	stationary	system	should	account	for	the	expected	loss	due	to	a	bank	failure,	but	calculating	that	expected	loss	requires	knowing	the	probability	of	bank	panics	and	failures	in	a	stationary	system.	There	was	also	the	issue	of	debt	forgiveness	that	makes	asset	growth	tend	positive.	Thus	all	results	should	be	taken	with	the	caveat	that	stationarity	in	assets	may	or	may	not	exist.	Regardless	of	whether	or	not	stationarity	holds,	it	is	the	firm	belief	of	the	author	that	proximity	based	learning	is	an	effective	method	of	communication	and	a	more	reasonable	assumption	of	what	information	is	available	to	consumers	as	opposed	to	the	perfect	visibility	in	the	DD	model.	The	PBLM	lays	the	foundation	for	future	research	regarding	the	panic	transmission	process.		 	
																																																								123	Franklin	D.	Roosevelt	(1933).		124	Given	that	panics	can	cascade	and	cause	a	strong	system	to	fail.	
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